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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the problem of content distribution in wireless peer-to-peer net-
works with selfish nodes. In this problem a group of wireless nodes need to exchange a set
of files over a lossless broadcast channel. Each node aims to maximize its own download
rate and minimize its upload rate. We propose a distributed protocol that provides incen-
tives for selfish nodes to participate in the content exchange. Our protocol does not require
any exchange of money and reputation and hence can be easily implemented without ad-
ditional infrastructure.
Then, we will analyze the performance of our protocol by focusing on the import-
ant case in which the system contains two files that need to be distributed. We derive a
closed-form expression of Nash Equilibrium and characterize the corresponding system
performance in discrete time. Furthermore, we propose a distributed mechanism where
the strategy of each node is only based on the observed history of the system and not on
the private information of other nodes.
We also study the performance characteristics of the systems that employ network
coding to facilitate data exchange. We show that, due to the free rider problem network
coding does not necessary improve the performance of the system and, in some cases, may
lead to worse system performance. We propose a novel approach to this problem based
on random coding. The performance of the network coding algorithms is validated by
performing extensive simulation study.
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1. NON-MONETARY PROTOCOL FOR WIRELESS PEER-TO-PEER CONTENT
DISTRIBUTION*
1.1 Introduction & Background
Recently, there has been a significant interest in using wireless peer-to-peer (P2P) net-
works to distribute information between mobile devices. The peer-to-peer content dis-
tribution has significant performance benefits. For example, in cellular networks mobile
phones can retrieve the required information from their peers instead of downloading it
from remote base stations. Since exchanging data between local devices requires signifi-
cantly less power and results in less interference with other devices, such an approach has
the potential of reducing power consumption and increasing spatial reuse.
Many existing studies (e.g., [4], [8] and [10]) have demonstrated the benefits of wire-
less P2P networks. However, these studies have assumed that all nodes are cooperative
and do not require additional incentives to cooperate. In practice, nodes may be selfish
and have little incentive to help other nodes to obtain the data they need. Therefore, a
major challenge for wireless P2P networks is to provide incentives to nodes in the net-
work so that they be willing to contribute to the network by sharing their data with other
nodes. While there are many studies, such as [1], [6] and [7], on this topic for wired P2P
networks, they cannot be applied to wireless P2P networks due to unique characteristics
of wireless medium. In particular, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium,
when a node transmits a packet, all nodes within the proximity of that node are able to
receive the packet. Therefore, in wireless P2P networks, data exchange involves many
*Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from “A Non-Monetary Protocol for Peer-to-Peer
Content Distribution in Wireless Broadcast Networks with Network Coding” by I-Hong Hou, Yao Liu and
Alex Sprintson, 2013, WiOpt.
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nodes within the system, rather than only two nodes as in wired P2P networks.
In this thesis research, we study wireless P2P networks with selfish nodes. We first
provide a model that considers the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions and the in-
centives of selfish nodes. Each node in the system aims to increase its download rate
and decrease its upload rate, so as to reduce its own power consumption. We then pro-
pose a protocol for content distribution for this setting. Our protocol does not require the
exchange of money, reputation, etc., and hence can be implemented without the need of
additional infrastructure. This non-monetary feature further distinguishes our work from
other studies that rely on additional infrastructure to set prices or payoffs [7], [2] and [3]
or to punish uncooperative nodes [5]. Moreover, our protocol can be easily modified to
employ network coding.
We provide a detailed performance analysis for our protocol in a discrete time scenario.
For the practically important case with two files in the system, we derive closed-form
expressions for each node’s strategies under a series of Nash Equilibria. We also derive
the prices of anarchy under these Nash Equilibria, both from a node’s perspective and the
whole system’s perspective.
We then integrate a network coding scheme into our protocol to improve the through-
put. Our results indicate is that in some settings using network coding may lead to smaller
per-node download rate. This problem arises due to the free riders which are introduced by
the network coding scheme. We design a randomized coding strategy which discourages
the nodes from adopting the free rider strategy and is able to utilize the network coding
technique to maximize the throughput.
2
1.2 System Model and Protocol Overview
We consider the direct data exchange problem [9] in which a group of wireless nodes
are collaborating to exchange the set of files X = {A,B,C, . . . }. Each node has a subset
of files inX available to it and needs to obtain all other files inX . The nodes use a lossless
broadcast channel to transmit files to other nodes. We assume that the files are very large,
hence a large number of packets need to be broadcasted over the channel to deliver every
file to other nodes. For clarity of presentation, we assume that each file contains infinitely
many packets. For long files, this assumption incurs a very small penalty in terms of the
accuracy of the obtained results.
In this thesis we focus on the special case in which each node n requires a single
file, denoted by Xn, and has all other files X\{Xn} available to it. This is an important
case that captures many of the salient features of the problem at hand. This case is of a
significant practical importance since in many settings wireless nodes need to recover only
a small number of packets, (e.g., packets that are lost due to fading or interference).
The broadcasting nature of wireless transmissions may result in a “free rider” prob-
lem as illustrated in the following example. Due to the free rider problem, the existing
protocols designed for wired networks cannot be applied directly to the wireless setting.
Consider a system with four nodes and two files where X1 = X2 = A and X3 =
X4 = B. Suppose that node 1 and node 3 exchange data, that is, node 1 transmits packets
of file B, and node 3 transmits packets of file A in return. As all nodes can receive all
transmissions, node 2 and node 4 can obtain packets of A and B without transmitting any
packet. Therefore, we say that nodes 2 and 4 are free riders. Figure 1.1 shows free riders
in a networks of 4 nodes,
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Figure 1.1: Free rider
In addition to being unfair, the possibility of being a free rider may prevent selfish n-
odes from transmitting data and contributing to the network. In the above example, each
node may refrain from transmitting data, in the hope that other nodes participate in ex-
changing data, making itself a free rider.
In this thesis, we propose a non-monetary protocol for P2P content distribution and
study its performance when all nodes are selfish.
1.3 Protocol Description
The transmission process consists of rounds such that during each round one packet
from A and one packet from B are broadcasted over the channel. At the beginning of
a round, each node n secretly picks a back-off time, τn. Node n then waits and listens
to the channel for τn time. If no transmissions take place in τn time, node n transmits a
control packet that contains the name Xn of the file required by n. The control packet can
be interpreted as an obligation of node n to transmit the next packet from a file held by
4
n if any other node transmits the next packet from file Xn (the next packet refers to the
packet which has not been broadcasted over the channel). Since the control packets are
very small, we assume that their transmission does not incur any cost and that the time
required for transmission of such packets is negligible. We refer to the time between the
beginning of the round and transmission of the control packet as the initiation phase.
After node n transmits the control packet, every node m that has file Xn secretly and
randomly picks a back-off timer τˆm. Every node m then waits and listens to the channel
for τˆm time. If no other nodes transmit in τˆm time, node m transmits a data packet of
Xn, and piggybacks its value of Xm. Upon receiving the data packet from node m, node n
responds with a packet ofXm, as promised in its control packet. The round ends after node
n completes broadcast of packet Xm and a new round begins. In this round, only nodes
that needXn and those that needXm receive a packet they need, and all other nodes do not
receive any useful packets. We refer to the time interval between the end of the initiation
phase and the transmission of a packet by node m as the response phase. Note that τn
and τˆm are lengths of the initialization and response phase, respectively. The protocol
execution is demonstrated in Figure 1.2,
5
Figure 1.2: An example of a 3 phases round
Intuitively, when a node n chooses large values of τn and τˆn, it is likely that node n does
not transmit, which increases its chance of being a free rider and reduces its transmission
cost. However, large values of τn and τˆn might result in large waiting times for n, which,
in turn, might result in a large waiting cost. By taking waiting costs into account, our
protocol provides incentive for the nodes to choose reasonably small values of τn and τˆn,
and hence enables the nodes to exchange data in an efficient manner. We also note that our
protocol is non-monetary and can be easily implemented for modern wireless networks
without the need of additional infrastructure.
Finally, the protocol can be modified for the settings in which the network coding
technique is used. The modified protocol is very similar to the one described above. Still,
at each round, exactly two data packets will be transmitted. With the network coding
technique, the packet broadcasted at the response phase will be a linear combination of
the packets available at the transmitting node. For example, suppose that X contains three
6
files A,B,C and node n requires file A, i.e., Xn = A. Then, in the response phase, node
n can send a combination of the next packet from B and the next packet from C (the
combination can be a linear operation underlying finite field). With network coding, all
nodes receive a packet they need in each round.
7
2. ANALYSIS UNDER DISCRETE TIME SCENARIO
In this section, we analyze the protocol in a discrete time scenario. There are two key
points should be considered at the beginning. First, in the discrete time model, a given
node has two potential actions in a specific time slot which are transmit a packet or to
be idle. This means the action of randomly picking up a back off time reduced to this
binary choices. Thus, rather than the random back off time, strategies for a node in the
discrete time scenario is the probability for it to transmit a packet in a specific time slot.
The second important fact should be noticed is that in the discrete time model, collisions
may happens in a time slot that causes the failure of transmission in that slot. Thus, extra
time slot in the same phase is triggered in order to let the transmission to be succeeded.
Since the analysis to the first phase and second phase are similar that can be thought of
a multiple players game, we only analyze a general scenario in which multiple nodes race
to transmit the same packets to a common receiver. We will start from the simplest case
in that involves only two nodes. Then, we will consider the more complicated ones such
as large file transmissions and multiple nodes compete to transmit packets with the same
transmit cost per time slot. Finally, we will come to the most general case in which there
are arbitary number of nodes and each of them has its own distant transmission costs.
We analyze the performance of our protocol under Nash Equilibrium. We consider the
performance from the system’s perspective. We will consider the throughout of the system
under Nash Equilibrium and the price of anarchy of system which is defined as follows:
Definition1: The price of anarchy for system under a Nash Equilibrium is the maxi-
mum throughput of the system under a cooperative scenario over the throughput under the
Nash Equilibrium.
We denote N as the number of nodes, m as the transmission cost per time slot, K as
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the number of slots each transmission takes, Γ as the throughput of the networks, Ω as the
price of anarchy of the whole system. Also, for simplicity, we assume the waiting cost for
all the nodes are same which is 1 per time slot.
2.1 Two Nodes with Distant Transmission Cost
In this section, we consider the case of N = 2. We assume that n1 and n2 are two
nodes involved in the transmission and the transmission cost for each nodes in a single
time slot are m1 and m2 respectively. Further, we assume K = 1. Each node has the
probability pi to choose the transmit policy at Nash Equilibrium. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
game for n1,
Figure 2.1: Costs for n1 given N = 2 and K = 1
where, Ct1 and Ci1 are the costs for n1 under the transmit policy. We can get the
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following equations at Nash Equilibrium,
Ct1 = p2[m1 + 1 + [p1Ct1 + (1− p1)Ci1]] + (1− p2)(1 +m1)
Ci1 = p2 + (1− p2)[[p1Ct1 + (1− p1)Ci1] + 1]
Ct1 = Ci1
Thus, we get,
p2 =
1
m1 + 2
Similarly, we can get
p1 =
1
m2 + 2
Let us consider the throughput and price of anarchy,
Γ = p1(1− p2) + p2(1− p1)
=
m1 +m2 + 2
(m1 + 2)(m2 + 2)
(2.1)
Ω =
(m1 + 2)(m2 + 2))
m1 +m2 + 2
(2.2)
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2.2 Large Packet Transmission
In this section, we consider the transmission of large packets which mean a success
transmission takes multiple time slots. Hence, unlike the case in last section, K > 1. The
rest remains the same.
The Figure 2.2 shows the game for n1,
Figure 2.2: Costs for n1 given N = 2 and K > 1
Denote Ct and Ci as the transmission cost for any node when under the transmit and
idle policy separately and p as the probability for any node to chooses the transmit policy
at Nash Equilibrium, then,
Ct = p [K(m+ 1) + [p1Ct1 + (1− p1)Ci1]] + (1− p)(m+ 1)K
Ci = pK + (1− p)[1 + [p1Ct1 + (1− p1)Ci1]]
We also have the following condition at Nash Equilibrium,
Ct = Ci
Using (8), (9) and (10), we get
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(K − 1)p2 + (mK + 2)p− 1 = 0
Hence,
p =
−(mK + 2) +√m2K2 + 4(m+ 1)K
2(K − 1) (2.3)
Now, we analyze the throughput and price of anarchy,
Γ = 2p(1− p) (2.4)
Ω =
maxα∈(0,1) 2α(1− α)
2p(1− p)
=
1
4p(1− p) (2.5)
2.3 Arbitary Number of Nodes, Same Transmission Cost
In this case, the number of nodes may be larger than 2. All the nodes share the same
transmission cost per time slot. Figure 2.3 illustrates this network.
12
Figure 2.3: Network model
In this network, all the nodes from n1 to nN want have packet B and want packet A.
Only node n have packet A and want packet B.
Because of symmetry, all the nodes have the same strategy at Nash Equilibrium. That
is, each node transmit packet with the same probability, denoted by p, in each time slot.
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show the game for n1,
Figure 2.4: Costs for n1 under action of transmitting given N > 2, symmetric case
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Figure 2.5: Costs for n1 under action of being idle given N > 2, symmetric case
Let us first consider the case that n1 chooses the transmit strategy. The probability that
the nodes {ni : i = 2, · · · , N} keep idle is (1 − p)n−1 while at least one node transmit
is 1 − (1 − p)n−1. Further, we denote the expected cost for n1 under transmit strategy at
Nash Equilibrium is Ct (since symmetry, all the nodes have the same cost),
Ct = (1− p)n−1(m+ 1) +
[
1− (1− p)n−1] (m+ 1 + Ct)
Now, we think of the case that n1 chooses the idle strategy. The probability that only
one node among {ni : i = 2, · · · , N} transmits is (n − 1)p(1 − p)n−2. We denote the
expected cost for n1 under idle strategy at Nash Equilibrium is Ci, then,
Ci = (n− 1)p(1− p)n−2 + (1 + Ci)
[
1− (n− 1)p(1− p)n−2]
At Nash Equilibrium, we also have
Ct = Ci
Using (14), (15) and (16), we come to the result,
p =
1
mn−m+ n (2.6)
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Then, let us discuss the throughput and price of anarchy at Nash Equilibrium
Γ = np(1− p)n−1
=
n
m(n− 1) + n
[
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
m(n− 1) + n
]n−1
Then, let us consider the case n goes to infinity,
lim
n→+∞
throughput = lim
n→+∞
n
m(n− 1) + n
[
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
m(n− 1) + n
]n−1
= lim
n→+∞
1
m+ 1
[
1− 1
(m+ 1)(n− 1) + 1
]n−1
=
1
m+ 1
lim
n→+∞
[[
1− 1
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
](m+1)(n−1)] 1m+1
Since
lim
n→+∞
[
1− 1
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
](m+1)(n−1)
= e−1
We come to the conclusion,
lim
n→+∞
throughput =
1
m+ 1
e−
1
m+1 (2.7)
Also, we can get
Ω =
maxα∈(o,1) nα(1− αn−1)
np(1− p)n−1
=
1
p(1− p)n−1
(n− 1)n−1
nn
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If n goes to infinity,
lim
n→+∞
Ω = lim
n→+∞
1
p(1− p)n−1
(n− 1)n−1
nn
= lim
n→+∞
1
np(1− p)n−1 limn→+∞
(n− 1)n−1
nn−1
= (m+ 1)e
1
m+1 e−1
Hence,
lim
n→+∞
Ω = (m+ 1)e−
m
m+1 (2.8)
2.4 Arbitary Number of Nodes, Different Transmission Costs
We extend the case in last section to one that nodes hold different transmission costs
per time slots. Assume that there are n nodes in the networks. Each node has a unique
transmission cost: mi : i = 1, 2, ..., N . In each time slot, node i has the probability
pi : i = 1, 2, ..., N to transmit its packets. Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show the game for n1.
Figure 2.6: Costs for n1 under action of transmitting given N > 2, asymmetric case
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Figure 2.7: Costs for n1 under action of being idle given N > 2, asymmetric case
We can find that, actually the forms above are the same with those in the last section.
Let us first consider the case that n1 chooses the transmit strategy. The probability that the
nodes {ni : i = 2, · · · , N} keep idle is
∏N
j=2(1 − pj) while at least one node transmit is
1 −∏Nj=2(1 − pj). Further, we denote the expected cost for n1 under transmit strategy at
Nash Equilibrium is Ct1, then
Ct1 = (m1 + 1) ·
N∏
j=2
(1− pj) + (m1 + 1 + Ct1) ·
[
1−
N∏
j=2
(1− pj)
]
Now, we think of the case that n1 chooses the idle strategy. The probability that only
one node among {ni : i = 2, · · · , N} transmits is
∑n
j=2
∏
k 6=1,j(1 − pk). We denote the
expected cost for n1 under idle strategy at Nash Equilibrium is Ci1, then,
Ci1 =
N∑
j=2
pj
∏
k 6=1,j
(1− pk) + (1 + Ci1)
[
1−
N∑
j=2
pj
∏
16=1,j
(1− pk)
]
At Nash Equilibrium, we also have
Ct1 = Ci1
17
Using equations (20), (21) and (22), we come to the following equation,
(m1 + 1)
∑
j 6=1
pj
∏
k 6=1,j
(1− pk) =
∏
j 6=1
(1− pj)
Similarly, we get such equations for nodes ni : i = 1, 2, ..., N combing the for n1, we
get the equation set,

(m1 + 1)
∑
j 6=1 pj
∏
k 6=1,j(1− pk) =
∏
j 6=1(1− pj);
(m2 + 1)
∑
j 6=2 pj
∏
k 6=2,j(1− pk) =
∏
j 6=2(1− pj);
...
(mN + 1)
∑
j 6=N pj
∏
k 6=N,j(1− pk) =
∏
j 6=N(1− pj).
Divide the left hand side expression in each equation by the one at the right hand side,
we get 
(m1 + 1)
∑
j 6=1
pj
1−pj = 1;
(m2 + 1)
∑
j 6=2
pj
1−pj = 1;
...
(mN + 1)
∑
j 6=N
pj
1−pj = 1.
(2.9)
Denote Aj =
pj
1−pj , j = 1, 2, . . . , N , we get,

(m1 + 1)
∑
j 6=1Aj = 1;
(m2 + 1)
∑
j 6=2Aj = 1;
...
(mN + 1)
∑
j 6=N Aj = 1.
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The equation set above is easy to solve, where
Aj =
1
n− 1
N∑
l=1
1
ml + 1
− 1
mj + 1
, j = 1, 2, ..., N
Thus, at Nash Equilibrium, the probability pj for each node to choose the transmit
policy in any time slot is
pj =
Aj
Aj + 1
, where Aj =
1
n− 1
N∑
l=1
1
ml + 1
− 1
mj + 1
, (2.10)
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Even though the price of anarchy does not make much sense in this case, we still
discuss it as follows,
Γ =
N∑
j=1
pj
∏
k 6=j
(1− pk) (2.11)
Ω =
maxαj∈(0,1)
∑N
j=1 αj
∏
k 6=j(1− αk)∑N
j=1 pj
∏
k 6=j(1− pk)
(2.12)
where, pj are the ones in (5).
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3. PROTOCOL WITH RANDOMIZED NETWORK CODING SCHEME
3.1 Protocol with Network Coding
In the previous section, all the sender in the second phase expect the same packet from
the receive. Hence, all of them will be benefited in the third phase since wireless networks
is broadcast. We now extend this case to the scenario that senders want different packet.
So in the protocol we just proposed, only one of them will be benefit. The question here is
how to improve the efficiency? We will now design a protocol with network coding scheme
in this section to maximize the throughput in this more complicated case. The basic idea
is the the sender in the third phase will send a packet which coded all the packets needed
by the other nodes together.
In this section, we discuss the scenario where there are multiple files in the system. N-
odes are separated into groups {na1, na2, . . . }, {nb1, nb2, . . . , }, {nc1, nc2, . . . }, . . . , where
a node in the group {na1, na2, . . . } needs the file A and possesses all other files, B, C,
. . . , etc. This means any nodes in the system misses one of the three files in the system.
It wants the missing file from the networks and is able the transmit the files it has to other
nodes.
The protocol with network coding can be shown in the following Figure 3.1,
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Figure 3.1: Three phases protocol with network coding
Initiation Phase: At the beginning of a round, each node n competes for sending a
control packet that contains its value of Xn to others in the same networks. This packet
is interpreted as a promise from node n saying that if any node transmits a packet of Xn,
node n will respond with a packet that n has. Each transmission takes one single time
slot. Collision happens if more than one packets transmitted in the same slot. As a result
of collision, all the packets transmitted are discarded. Initiation phase ends when there is
only one node, say n, transmits the control while others be idle.
Respond Phase: After node n transmits the control packet, every node m that has the
file Xn starts to competes for transmitting a data packet of Xn. Similarly, this phase ends
when there is only one node responds n with packet Xn. Also, m piggybacks its value of
Xm. Then, the last phase is triggered.
Exchange Phase: Upon receiving the data packet form node m, node n responds with
a coded packets which benefits all nodes other than n in the networks. This will end the
current round and start the next one.
Drawback of this protocol exists which prevents it reaching the maximum throughput.
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The basic idea here is that a node has chance to be a freerider if it chooses to be idle in
the respond phase. This comes from the fact that node n benefits all the other nodes with
a coded packet in the exchange phase. The intuition to solve this problem is to punish the
free rider in the third phase. This leads us to come with the randomized network coding
scheme.
3.2 Protocol with Randomized Network Coding Scheme
The difference between the protocol proposed above and the one with randomized
network coding scheme lies in the exchange phase. In the old protocol, node n benefits all
the other nodes while only node m is guaranteed to be benefited in the new protocol. And
nodes other than n and m are benefited with a probability p such that 0 < p < 1.
The randomized network coding algorithm is illustrated in the following Figure 3.2,
Figure 3.2: Randomized algorithm
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For simplicity, we assume that there is only one node in each of the group, that is n1, n2
and n3 miss packets A, B and C separately. But they have the other two packets. Suppose
n1 sends the control packet in the first phase and n2 responds n1 with what it wants in the
second phase. In the protocol with network coding in the last subsection, n1 will benefit
both the other two in the third phase while in the randomized algorithm, n1 will benefit n2
with 100 percentage but n3 with a probability p.
The intuition here is that any freeride is punished in the exchange phase since there
is probability (1 - p) it does not receive the packet it wants. This fact increases nodes’
willingness to contribute to the networks in the respond phase and as a result improves the
overall performance of the protocol.
3.3 Protocol Performance Analysis
Now, let us analyze this protocol with game theory. Take the simplest case as an
example. Suppose there are 3 nodes in the networks, n1, n2 and n3. Each node misses
one packets and has two different packets other nodes want. All the nodes transmit packet
with the save cost, that is m per time slot whatever it is a data packet or a control one. And
waiting cost for nodes is 1 per time slot. Total cost equals to the transmission cost plus the
waiting cost. The goal for each node is to download the packet it wants with the lowest
cost.
In the game, strategy for each node is the probability it chooses to transmit a packet in
each time slot which can be shown in Figure 3.3,
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Figure 3.3: Strategy for each node
Let me introduce the notations needed in the analysis. We denote Pˆ1 = Pr{n1 does not
transmit in the initiation phase} and Pˆ2 = Pr{n1 does not transmit in the respond
phase | n1 does not transmit in the initiation phase}. We should notice that Pˆ1 = 23
and Pˆ2 = 12 due to symmetry.
p1 and p2 denote the probabilities that any node chooses to transmit a packet in a slot
in the first or second phase separatively. Ct1 and Ci1 are costs for a node from the current
slots in the initiation phase to the end of the round if it chooses to transmit or be idle in
the current slot under NE. Ct2 and Ci2 are the costs for nodes from the slots belongs to
respond phase to the end of round under NE. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 show those four kinds of
costs,
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Figure 3.4: Ct1 and Ci1
Figure 3.5: Ct2 and Ci2
We also denote C1 and C2 to be the expected cost for a single node to successfully get
the packet it wants start from the beginning of the first phase and second phase respectively.
Moreover, T2 is the expected time of the respond phase, and obviously,
T2 =
1
2p2(1− p2) (3.1)
Since the analysis of respond phase depends on that of initiation phase, let us first
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consider the seconde phase. Figure 3.6 shows the expected costs for n2 in the respond
phase under specific policies of n2 and n3 given n1 transmits control packet in the initiation
phase.
Figure 3.6: Expected costs in respond phase
First, let us consider Ct2. In this case, n2 transmit in the first time slot of the sec-
ond phase. If n3 also transmits in this slot of which probability is p2, collision happens.
According to the Figure 3.6, cost for n2 from the current time instant to the end of the
transmission round is (m + 1) + [p2Ct2 + (1 − p2)Ci2]. Another case is n3 being idle in
this slot of which probability is (1 − p2), and cost for n2 is (m + 2), hence, the expected
cost for n2 if it chooses to transmit in the current time slot is,
Ct2 = p2[m+ 1 + p2Ct2 + (1− p2)Ci2] + (1− p2)(m+ 2) (3.2)
Similarly, the expected cost for n2 if it chooses to be idle in the current time slot is
Ci2 = 2p2 + (1− p2)(1 + p2Ct2 + (1− p2)Ci2) (3.3)
Now, let us consider C2 under all the possible strategies of n2. If it transmits in the
current slot, its cost from now to the end of the round is Ct2. In the meantime, n3 will also
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transmit with probability p2 which causes collision and triggers a new slot in the second
phase. Then with probability Pˆ2, n3 finally responds n1 in this phase, and the randomized
NC causes n2 will not be benefited in the 3rd phase with probability (1− p). Recursively,
it will cost n2 another C1 to get the packet it wants. Hence,
C2 = Ct2 + p2Pˆ2(1− p)C1 (3.4)
Similarly,
C2 = Ci2 +
[
p2 + (1− p2)Pˆ2
]
(1− p)C1 (3.5)
Then, let us analyze the initiation phase. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the expected
costs for n1 in the first phase under specific actions of all the nodes.
Figure 3.7: Expected costs in init phase under action of transmitting
Figure 3.8: Expected costs in init phase under action of being idle
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Let us first consider Ct1. In this case, n1 transmits in the current time slot. This trans-
mission will succeed only in the case that all the other nodes remain idle. The probability
of this event is (1 − p1)2. According to the Figure 3.8, cost of n1 from now to the end of
the round is 2m + 2 + T2. In all the other cases in which there will be at most one of the
other nodes transmit, collision happens. More slots are needed in this phase. Thus,
Ct1 =
[
1− (1− p1)2
]
[m+ 1 + p1Ct1 + (1− p1)Ci1] + (1− p1)2(2m+ 2 + T2) (3.6)
Similarly,
Ci1 = [1− 2p1(1− p1)] [1 + p1Ct1 + (1− p1)Ci1]+2p1(1−p1) [T2(p2m+ 1) + 2] (3.7)
Now, let us move to considerC1 under all the possible strategies of n1. If it transmits in
the current slot, its cost from now to the end of the round is Ct1. If any of the other nodes
also transmit at the same time of which probability is 1− (1− p1)2, collision happens and
everything re-start from the beginning. Hence,
C1 = Ct1 +
[
1− (1− p1)2
]
C1 (3.8)
With the same approach, we get,
C1 = Ci1 +
[
2p1(1− p1)Pˆ2(1− p) + [1− 2p1(1− p1)]Pˆ1Pˆ2(1− p)
]
C1 (3.9)
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Further, we should notice that throughput is expressed as follows,
Γ =
2 + p
( 1
3p1(1−p1)2 +
1
2p2(1−p2) + 1) ∗ 3
(3.10)
3.4 Simulation
Figure 3.9 - 3.14 are the simulation results of throughput verse p under different trans-
mission costs which range from 0 to 5,
Figure 3.9: Throughput vs. p when m = 0
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Figure 3.10: Throughput vs. p when m = 1
Figure 3.11: Throughput vs. p when m = 2
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Figure 3.12: Throughput vs. p when m = 3
Figure 3.13: Throughput vs. p when m = 4
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Figure 3.14: Throughput vs. p when m = 5
We can see that the optimal strategy which is the p maximum the throughput lies
between points 0 and 1 which. We can get other two observations,
(1) pmax decreases with m going up;
(2) We benefit more from the randomized network coding scheme with a higher trans-
mission cost.
The intuition here is that with transmission costs increasing, nodes are less willing to
transmit packet. Hence, we need to punish the freerider more to achieve high throughput.
Also, we lose more if we benefit all the freeriders in the exchange phase.
Figure 3.15 is the maximum throughput under different transmission cost,
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Figure 3.15: Max throughput under different transmission costs
Figure 3.15 shows that the maximum throughput decreases when m increases. This
makes sense since nodes has less willingness to transmit a packet under a larger transmis-
sion cost.
Further, Figure 3.16 shows the gap between the maximum and minimum throughput
when transmission cost changes,
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Figure 3.16: Gap between maximum and minimum throughput under different m
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4. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis considers the problem of content distribution in wireless P2P networks
and proposes a model that captures both the broadcast nature of wireless medium and the
incentives of nodes. The thesis presents a non-monetary protocol for content distribution in
this model. The protocol provides incentives for selfish nodes to contribute to the network.
We have studied the performance of our protocol when all nodes are selfish. For systems
with only two files, we have derived closed-form expressions for Nash Equilibria and
prices of anarchy.
For systems with more than two files, we study the system performance under both
scenarios where network coding is and is not employed. For each scenario, we derive a
procedure for finding the Nash Equilibrium. We also propose a randomized algorithm to
solve the free rider problem which introduced by network coding scheme. While it is hard
to derive a closed-form expression for the throughput for the protocol with randomized
network coding scheme under Nash Equilibrium, we provide simulation result instead.
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